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Let I’ = (T {WET, {H&T) b e an n-person game in which T = fi c N, and any subset K c T 
can form a coalition with the utility function CiEK Hi(s), where Hi : ny=, Si + R1 is a utility 
function of player i, i E F defined on a set of all allowable strategies of the players [l] ; this 
game is called the master game further in this article. 
As shown in [2], sets of Nash equilibrium strategies in two noncooperative games engendered 
by this game, namely, in 
Game I. 
min 
~)T\KEIT\ 
which is an antagonistic game between the coalitions K and T \ K with the payoff function 
CieK Hi(t~,m\K)r and the second noncooperative game, 
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Game II, 
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which is a noncooperative game of two players (the coalition K and the coalition T \ K), coincide 
providing that both games have Nash equilibrium pure or mixed strategies (where mixed strategies 
are probabilistic measures over the sets IK = nieK Si and IT\K = flieTiK S,, respectively). and 
the master game is a game with constant sum. However, as mentioned in [2], it is not a priori 
clear what kind of relations may exist between the numbers 
and 
c Hi (&r $"jK) I 
iET\K 
where (&rV;,K) and 6+&K) are solutions to Game I and to Game II, respectively, in the 
general case, where the master game is not a game with constant sum, which means that in the 
general case, a preference of playing Game I or II does not a priori exist for the coalition T \ K. 
The following examples show that the established coincidence of sets of solutions to Games I 
and II may not take place in noncooperative n-person games engendering Games I and II that 
are not games with constant sum. 
(a) Let players (for instance, firms operating in a marketplace [3]) have the following utility 
functions: 
h(x) = Xl + x2, f2@) = x2 +x3, f3(5) = Xl + 23, 
and let each of the players have the following sets of strategies: 
xi E {1,2} (Player l), x2 E {3,4} (Player 2), 53 E {5,6} (Player 3). 
Let K be the coalition formed by Players 1 and 2 so that Games I and II are finite games 
in which the coalition T \ K (Player 3) plays with the coalition K: 
Game I 
max (xi + 2x2 + zs) --+ I$ 
(Q.52) 
n$i(Zi+Zx2+23)--, max, 
(I1 92) 
and 
Game II 
x1+2x2+x3-+ max, 
(21 ,+z) 
51+533max. 
53 
It is easy to conclude that the triple (2,4,5) is a solution to Game I as 
xi+2x2+5<2+2x4+5~2+2x4+x3, 51 E (1,2}, x2 E {3,4}, 53 E {5,6}, 
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whereas the triple (2,4,6) is a solution to Game II as 
q+2~+6<2+2x4+6, 31 E {1,2), x2 E (3,417 
2+x352+6, x3 E {5,6), 
so playing Game II turns out to be a preferable behavior for the coalition T\ K although it 
leads to increasing the gain to be attained by the coalition K comparing to that attained 
by the coalition K in Game I. 
(b) Let the players have the following utility functions: 
fl(21,~2,23,24) = min(zl, -XI +2X3), 
1 
f3(x1,~2,x3rx4) = 1 + (x3 _ 3j2 + (Xl - 3)2, 
f4(xl,x2,x3,54) 1 = - 
1 + (x4 - 3)2 
+ (52 3)2, 
whereas let the sets of strategies for each player be 
XI E {2,3} (Player l), x2 E {2,3} (Player 2), 
x3 E {2,3} (Player 3), x4 E {2,3} (Player 4), 
and let the coalition K consist of Players 1 and 2. Then the coalition T \ K should consider 
two games: 
Game I 
(;ax){min(xi, -21 + 2x3) + min(x2, -x2 + 2x4)} + min , 
Cz~~j{min(xi, -xi + 22s) + min(x2, -x2 + 2x4)} 
(a&l) 
-+ max, 
(21 ,z2) 
and 
Game II 
minh, -51 + 223) + min(x2, -x2 + 2x.4 -+ max , 
(~l>Q) 
1 1 
1+ (x3 - 3)2 
+ (21 - 3)2 + 
1 + (x4 - 3)2 + (52 - 3)2 + (y$. 
It is easy to conclude that the quadruple (2,2,2,2) is a solution to the problem 
g=)tmin(a, -21 + 2x3) + min(z2, -x2 + 224)) --+ ~gh~, 
as 
max -21 + 2 X + -22 + 2 X 
(z1,52) 
{min(xi, 2) min(x2, 2)) 
=2+2=4=f1(2,2,2,2)+f2(2,2,2,2), 
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(Ez)(min(x1, -x1 + 2 x 3) + min(Xz, --Ic2 + 2 x 2)} 
= 3 + 2 = 5 = f1(3,2,3,2) + f2(3,2,3,2). 
(gz){min(X1, -x1 + 2 x 2) + min(x2, -x2 + 2 x 3)) 
= 2 + 3 = 5 = fi(2,3,2,3) + f2(2,3,2,3), 
mz){min(X1, -x1 + 2 x 3) + min(x2, -X2 + 2 x 3)) 
= 3 + 3 = 6 = fi(3,3,3,3) + f2(3,3,3,3) 
It is also easy to establish that this quadruple is a solution to Game I, as it is a solution 
to the problem 
($m) (min(x1, -X1 + 2x3) + min(x2, -X2 + 2x4)} -+ (:a~,, 
which can be done in just the same manner it was done for the previous problem so that 
the gain that the coalition T \ K ( consisting of Player 3 and Player 4) attains by choosing 
the strategy x3 = 2, x4 = 2 in the framework of counteracting the coalition K equals 
f3(2,2,2,2)+f4(2,2,2,2)=;+1+;+1=3. 
At the same time, the quadruple (3,3,3,3) is a Nash equilibrium point in Game II as 
f1(~1,~2,3,3)+f2(21,X2,3,3)=min(X1,-X1+2X3)+min(X2,-X:z+2X3) 
I 3 + 3 = f1(3,3,3,3) + f2(3,3,3,3), X1 E {2,3), X2 E {2,3) 
and 
1 
f3(3,3, X3,X4) + f4(3,3, x3, x4) = I + (x3 _ 3)2 
1 
<2 
+ 1 + (x4 - 3)2 - 
= f3(3,3,3,3) + J-4(3,3,3,3), x3 E {2,3), x4 E {2,3), 
so that 
f3(2, 2,2,2) + f4(2,2,2,2) = 3 > 2 = f3(3r 3,3,3) + f4(3,3,3> 3) 
and playing Game I turns out to be a preferable behavior for the coalition T \ K 
(c) Let the players have the following utility functions: 
fl(X) = Xl +X2, fi(X) = x2 - X3, f3(X) = Xl + X3, 
whereas sets of strategies for each player remain the same as in (a), i.e., 
x1 E {1,2} (Player l), x2 E {3,4} (Player 2), x3 E {5,6} (Player 3). 
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Let K be the coalition formed by Player 1 and Player 2. Then the coalition T \ K should 
consider two games: 
Game I 
max (xl + 2x2 - x3) + rnrr, 
(~lr+P) 
rnri(xr+2x3-x3)+ max, 
(511-22) 
and 
Game II 
xi + 2x3 - x3 -+ max , 
h,+d 
xr+x3--,max. 
53 
It obvious that while the triple (2,4,6) is a solution to Game I as 
x1+2x3-6~2+2x4-6~2+2x4--_3, x3 E (5,617 
this triple is also a solution to Game II as 
xi+2x3--652+2x4-6, 21 E {1,2), x2 E (3741, 
2+x352+6, x3 E (5,617 
so playing either game does not make a difference for the coalition T \ K in terms of the 
gain to be attained. 
Thus, both inequalities 
and 
as well as the equality 
may hold in an arbitrary n-person game for which Games I and II have Nash equilibrium points 
so that the surrounding (the coalition T \ K) for the coalition K should consider both games 
in order to choose its preferable strategy in dealing with the coalition K depending on in which 
game (Game I or II), the gain for the coalition T \ K turns out to be higher. 
One should, however, notice that although in all three cases (a), (b), and (c) considered in this 
article, Game I is solvable, the coalition T \ K can, in fact, limit its interest to considering and 
solving the problem 
CFzK c H&Kr vT\K) + V,,-‘& 
%EK 
in the framework of Game I as a Nash equilibrium point may not exist in Game I. Moreover, all 
three relations between the gains in Games I and II may hold when only 
inf sup c H~(~K,~]T\K) 
VT\KEIT\K &EIK aET\K 
is a real number. 
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